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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION,
Libelant and Appellant and
Cross-Respondent,

vs.

Case
No. 8649

CLUB FERACO, et al,

Libelees and Respondents and
Cross Ap pel/ants.

BRIEF OF LIBELEES
UPON
CROSS-APPEAL

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Libelee is a non-profit Corporation of the State of Utah,
Salt Lake City, Utah, and is a locker club with bona fide members and membership for the use of guests and members and
was such on November 2, 1956 (Findings of Fact, I.)
In the early morning hours of November 2, 1956, Salt
Lake City Policeman Ralph Caldwell, claims to have purchased
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whiskey at the club in violation of Title 32, Chapter 7, Section
1, 1953 Utah Code Annotated, and he then and there seized

all personal property at the club premises, without a warrant,
under the provisions of Title 32, Chapter 8, Section 17, 1953
Utah Code Annotated. (Findings of Fact VI, VII and VIII.)
During the morning and afternoon of November 2, 1956,
Chief of Police W. Cleon Skousen ordered and supervised the
removal of all personal property from the club premises, such
property itemized in the Judgment of the Trial Court dated
January 29, 1957. (Findings of Fact X and XI), and in Libelant's Schedule A.
In removing said property, the Police used prisoners of
Salt Lake City for some of the labor. (Findings of Fact XX),
and some of the property was hauled away in dump trucks
(Findings of Fact XX).
In removing said property, the Police and whoever they
supervised in the moving \\ere wantonly careless, reckless and
destructive. And in the process of said removal real property
was also destroyed. (Findings of Fact XY, XVII, XVIII,

XIX, XXI).
Trial of the issues was had and d1e Trial Court found that
policeman Caldwell had purchased whiskey on November 2,
1956 and t'herefore seizure of some items of personal property
was legal. These items, designated in d1e January 29th, 1957,

rudament
were sold at 1.oublic auction on l\1arch 2. 1957 for
b
"

.I

$10.00.

The Court, in the same Judgment, ordered certain property
returned, \\ hich return was procured by execution issued on
February 9, 1957.
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There are bottles of whiskey, specified in said same Judgment, which have been ordered destroyed. All of the whiskey
seized belonged to club members, but the only claim filed
for the whiskey was by Club Feraco, claiming it as bailee for
its members. (Findings of Fact XV and XXIII).
Libelees take this appeal from the ruling of the Trial
Court that any part of said seizure was lawful.
On February 11, 1957, Leonard Feraco and Mary Hooley,
two of the Libelees in this action, were tried for the criminal
offense of illegally selling whiskey to policeman Caldwell on
November 2, 1956, the sale upon which this seizure was based.
They were both acquitted of that offense in Case No. 33855,
Salt Lake City Court.
Upon the basis of that acquittal Libelees made a motion
to dismiss the Judgment of legal seizure, sale and destruction,
under the provisions of Rule 60, (b) ( 6), U.R.C.P., but the
Trial Court denied such motion.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
The evidence does not justify a finding that whiskey was
illegally sold and if so, the only evidence of illegal use of
personal property pertains to one bottle of whiskey, four
glasses and one table.
POINT II.
The Trial Court abused its equity discretion m refusing
to set aside its Judgment of sale and forfeiture of property
5
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because of the acquittal of Mary Hooley and Leonard Feraco
of the very crime upon which the seizure of all property \\·as
predicated.
POINT III.
Title 32, Chapter 8, Section 17, 1953 Ctah Code Annotated is unconstitutional under the provisions of Article I,
Section 7, Utah State Constitution, as permitting denial of due
process of law and said Title, Chapter and Section is proscribed
by the XIVth Amendment of the Constitution of t:he United
States.
POINT IV.
The action of the police officers in the seizure of property
is void and prohibited by Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution, as being brutal and unreasonable.
POINTV.
Title 32, Chapter 8, Sections 16, 17, 18, 46 and 48, 1953
Utah Code Annotated are void as being ambiguous and vesting
judicial function in policemen, proscribed by Article V, Section
I, Utah State Constitution, and said provisions are contrary
to Article I, Section 2-L Utah State Constitution, and contrary
to the XIVth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.
POINT VI.
The seizure in this action should be voided and declared
unlawful by recurrence to fundamental principles to protect
individual rights as prescribed by Article I, Section 27, Utah
State Constitution.

6
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY A FINDING
THAT WHISKEY WAS ILLEGALLY SOLD AND IF SO,
THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL USE OF PERSONAL
I.
" PROPERTY PERTAINS TO ONE BOTTLE OF WHISKEY,
FOUR GLASSES AND ONE TABLE.
'(·

By construing all of the evidence presented in the light
most favorable to Libelant there was no proof of an illegal
sale of liquor to policeman Caldwell.
There follows the only testimony concerning the purported
illegal sale of whiskey on November 2, 1956, as a result of
which the seizure took place:

DIRECT EXAMINATION, POLICEMAN CALDWELL:
Tr. 5, Lines 21, et seq:

"Q. What happened after that?
"A. A waitress came over and asked us what we would
like.
"A. We all ordered drinks.
Tr. 6, lines 1, et seq:

"Q. How many drinks did you order?
"A. Four.

"Q. Were four drinks brought to you?
"A. Yes.

"Q. -did you take a bottle to ~he club with you?
"A. -No.
7
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"Q. -I believe you stated you did take a sip of the
drink that was given to you?
"A. Yes. It tasted like whiskey.

"Q. Do you know whether those drinks had been paid
for or not?
"A. Yes.

"Q.And do you know how much?
"A. No.

CROSS EXAMINATION, POLICEMAN CALDWELL:
Tr. 19, Lines 6, et seq:

''Q. Who mixed them?
"A. Leonard Feraco.

"Q. Did you see what bottle he took these drinks
of?
"A. No.
"Q. Did you order another round?
"A. No.

out

Tr. 34, Lines 6, et seq:

"Q. Did you buy any drinks?
"A. No.
"Q. -Paxton (a member) bought some, didn't he?
"A. That's right.
"A. And in your presence there was no police officer
bought any drinks there, nor neither of your two
informant, is that right?
"A. Will you repeat that?

"Q. Paxton bought them, didn't he?
"A. Yes."
8
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To this point, Libelees urge that it is apparent that policeman Caldwell did not know what had happened, but in his
zeal to be a good policeman, he then declared all property
seized and the next day turned it over to his Chief, who truly
completd a rape of civil liberty based upon the events above
testified to.
That testimony will not sustain the burden, even civil,
put upon the State to justify such severe and drastic measures
of seizure and forfeiture. The State's burden of evidence should
be "clear, cogent and convincing," the ordinary burden placed
upon one claiming forfeiture.
To explain this so-called illegal sale, we examme the
testimony of a member in good standing of the Utah State
Bar, Mr. Sumner

J.

Hatch, who testified he told the waitress

to get Paxton, the member, and his friends, two stool-pigeons
and policeman Caldwell, a drink out of his bottle (Tr. 13 7
to 139).
Libelees urge that this Court would set a dangerous precedent if such severe, arbitrary and destructive police measures
are held to be justified and are sustained upon evidence that
is so flimsy that clearly, policeman Caldwell had to guess
whether or not there was an illegal sale of whiskey, or merely
a gift of whiskey by a friend, with mixer and ice being paid
for, which practice, the Court can take judicial notice of, 1s
common at all of the so-called major clubs in the State.

If this Court finds the evidence does justify the findings
of illegal sale, how can it justify seizure of liquor in lockers
found to belong to members? The lockers had to be broken
up to get the liquor.
9
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Further, Libelees proved the liquor was bailed to Club
Feraco.
The above is all supported by testimony found to be true.
(Findings of Fact XXIII).
To be fair and avoid specious construction of statutory
language, if there was illegal sale of whiskey, what instruments
were used?
(a) Four ( 4) glasses.
(b) Two ( 2) bottles of whiskey ( 1 scotch, 1 bourbon).
(c) The table they were set on.
(d) The booth, which incidentally is a part of the real
property.
The whiskey in the lockers could have been saved, according to the tenure of the Trial Court's decision, if each member
owning t'he whiskey, bearing in mind this was found to be
a bona fide club for members and guests (Findings of Fact
I), had:

( 1) Gone to an Attorney and had him prepare a claim
and file it with the Clerk of the District Court, and

( 2) Then become a party defendant in a notorious, what
appeared to be "bootleg" case, and
( 3) Sat around waiting to testify in a Yery lengthy proceeding.
Further, aU of the liquor behind the bar that was seized
was identified as being owned by individual members and
guests. (Tr. 120, 137 to 143, 145 to 147, 148 to 150, 152 to
155).
10
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And despite efforts of the County Attorney to prove there
was such a thing as a house bottle, that whole precept collapsed.
To affirmatively prove there was no such thing as a house
bottle, Libelees proved by the testimony of Charles H. Foote,
an employee of the Liquor Commission, that no purchases of
whiskey had ever been made by Leonard Feraco, Ross Feraco
or Club Feraco (Tr. 113).

If this decision is permitted to stand, the Great Sovereign
State of Utah with the help of the glorious Chief of Police of
Salt Lake City will indeed have rung a gorgeous knell in the
preservation of public health and welfare.
BUT WHAT ABOUT SOVEREIGN DIGNITY?

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS EQUITY DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS JUDGMENT
OF SALE AND FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY BECAUSE
OF THE ACQUITTAL OF MARY HOOLEY AND LEONARD FERACO OF THE VERY CRIME UPON WHICH
THE SEIZURE OF ALL PROPERTY WAS PREDICATED.
The Civil Trial of this matter was commenced on November 23, 1956.
Final Judgment was rendered on January 29, 1957.
On February 11, 1957, the criminal charge on the "whiskey sale" of November 2, 1956, was tried in the Salt Lake
11
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City Court, Case No. 33855, prosecuted by the Attorneys for
Libelant.
The Jury acquitted the Club Manager and the waitress.
There it stands, approximately $18,000 worth of property
hauled away based upon the commission of a criminal offense
that was not committed.
Counsel, being aware of the "form difference" between
a ciminal action and civil action involving forfeiture, however,
avoided his clients who were seeking an explanation and made
a motion that the Trial Court set aside its Judgment of forfeiture and sale under the provisions of Rule 60, (b) ( 6), U.R.C.P.,
which reads:
"Rule 60.-Relief from Judgment or Order."
"b ( 6) ... or it is no longer equitable that the Judgment should have prospective application;"
That motion was argued on March 4, 1957, and denied.
That this case is one in equity cannot be denied, as a
part of 32-8-47, 1953 Utah Code Annotated provides: "Such
action shall be brought and tried as an action in equity . . . "
Libelees claim that all dictates of equity-the breath,
the spirit of decency, justice and expected fairness of intercourse between men and sovereign and citizen demand that
the Judgment against Libelees in this matter should have been
set aside.
The Libelees, Leonard Feraco and l\1ary Hooley, sold
whiskey to policeman Caldwell on November 2, 1956, in violation of 32-7-1, 1953 Utah Code Annotated. (Libel of Information). They were acquitted on February 11, 1957.
12
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32-8-17, providing for search and seizure without warrant,
the statute upon which this seizure was based, specified seizure
may be made upon "violation of any provision of this Act."

Clearly, the seizure is predicated upon the commtsswn
of a crime and would be void without a crime.
The charged defendants were, in fact, found not to have
committed that crime. Yet they stand here guilty.
Counsel does not profess to have attained great scholastic
recognition. Yet, he has not had difficulty in discussing difficult
precepts of law with lay friends and clients nor with well
versed members of the Bar. Nor has he experienced difficulty
in the persuasion that law is merely a code of ethics, largely
dictated by morality, decency and fair play.
This Court and opposing counsel can tell me and I will
agree with the esotercism of dogmatic academics and slavish
adherance to form that there is a difference between civil
forfeiture and criminal prosecutions. There is a difference in
the ends sought and the evils to be guarded against and the
burden of proof and etc., etc., and etc.
Talk to me about substance.
Here we have heavy forfeiture and penalty and deprivation
of property for an offense against a sovereign that that very
same sovereign could not prove took place.
Convince me academically-then try to convmce good
people not formally schooled in the law but having ordinary
conscience and morality.
Let such things happen to enough good people and this
13
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government would be overthrown-if they were not first
crushed by sainted police with mailed fist, blackjack and
bullets.
Counsel submits that we should perhaps keep our neat
and fine distinctions; language preciseness is a useful tool for
conveyance of meanings of good and suppression of evil.
Let's keep our legal distinctions nice and neat and intact.
There is a difference between crime and civil forfeiture.
But, don't abandon and defile the principles of Equity.
It is not equitable that the judgment of seizure, forfeiture
and sale have prospective application, even conceding constitutionality, condoning brutaility and finding Libelees guilty
on every civil charge.

POINT III.
TITLE 32, CHAPTER 8, SECTION 17, 1953 UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, UTAH
STATE CONSTITUTION, AS PERMITTING DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND SAID TITLE, CHAPTER
AND SECTION IS PROSCRIBED BY THE XIV AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES.
Article I, Section 7, Utah State Constitution:
"NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW."
14
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Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States:
" . . . NOR SHALL ANY STATE DEPRIVE ANY
PERSON OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT
DUE PROCESS OF LAW."
The right to conduct a lawful business in a lawful manner
is, of course, one of the fundamental principles to be protected
under both Constitutions.
The Statute offending these guarantees is as follows:
"32-8-17. SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT. When a
violation of any provisions of this Act shall occur in the presence of any . . . police officer . . . it shall be the duty of such
officer without warrant to arrest the offender ... and if such
arresting officer has reason to believe that one of the businesses
conducted in the premises . . . was in violation . . . of this
Act he shall seize all tangible personal property in said premises ...

The above section is the one involved in this action. There
was arrest and seizure of all of the property without a warrant.
Club Feraco, to uselessly delineate the obvious, was effectively
and instantaneously put out of business by policemen Caldwell
and Skousen. Examination of a list of the property seized,
Libelants' Exhibit A, should demonstrate the degree of the
closing of the business.
It was total.

Libelees ask where is the due process guaranteed by Federal and State Constitutions ?
This is exactly tantamount to saying that the victim may
be killed and then a trial shall be held posthumously.

15
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All business, lega] or illegal, is thus permitted to be violently stopped as a matter of discretion, and upon the judgment
of a policeman.
The evil of such a Statute should be adequately demonstrated in this case, assuming full validity to the Trial Court's
judgment.
Part of the business was decreed to be legal, yet its operation was forcefully and summarily suspended by policemen
and convicted criminals.
The inherent evil of such provision is further demonstrated
by the fact that this Statute gives the power to policemen to
do what this Honorable Court has adjudged that a State District
Court cannot do, to-wit: prevent the operation and conduct
of a lawful business.
"32-8-47. ABATEMENT. An action to enjoin any nuisance
defined in this Act may be brought . . . and the Court . . .
shall forthwith . . . restrain the defendant from conducting
or permitting the continuance of such nuisance until the conclusion of the trial ... "
Libelant, in this action, sought to have Club Feraco declared a nuisance under the provisions of the above Code Section
and under 32-8-46. (See Paragraph 4 of the Libel of Information.)
This Court, in the case of Riggins -vs. District Court, 89
Utah 183; 51 P.2nd, 645, held that the Court could not restrain
or enjoin any lawful use of premises prior to the conclusion
of the trial.
16
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The same result was held by this Court in Utah Liquor
Control Commission vs. McGillis, 89 Utah 183; 65 P.2nd
1136.

If the Trial Court's decision is permitted to stand, there
must of necessity, therefore, be announced as a rule of law
that in the State of Utah a Court of competent jurisdiction
may not prevent the operation of a lawful business, but if
it is suspended before trial it must be closed by a policeman.
That is a dangerous rule.
It is a precedent that could foster viciousness and if it

didn't creat viciousness it would certainly protect it.
How many further steps would need be condoned, on
such principle, before we were in the sewer of a police State?
Not many.
Due process would result if after hearing, probable cause
was established and unlawful conduct were enjoined until
trial of all of the issues.
No process results when a policeman says I think the
whole business is illegal so I'll close it. If he is wrong, so
what? You have a civil action against a policeman w'ho may
earn $4,000.00 per year. But in any event, the subsequent civil
action given wouldn't substitute for due process at the inception.
You don't kill the accused and give him a posthumous
hearing and call it due process.
Counsel will agree that such a Statute might be reasonable
if it could be shown that such great harm would result to the
public that there was immediate necessity ror summary action
17
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and that any resulting harm done to the business closed would
pale when compared to the damage that would result by
merely determining what was lawful or unlawful and then
stopping the unlawful part.
In our case no such emergency can be shown, but on the
contrary to further point up brutality, why wasn't a warrant
obtained ? Skousen and his men had reason to believe that an
illegal business was being conducted at Club Feraco for 19
months before they summarily and without warrant closed it.
(See Findings of Fact No. V.)
It is this Court's duty to 'hand down a decision that
strengthens that fundamental precept that everybody shall
have his day in Court before he is condemned and punished.
Due process does not contemplate immediate condemnation and punishment with belated opportunity to show that
a policeman was wrong in boarding up a business that a Court
could not touch.
In our case and under the Statute complained of the
police are the investigators, the Judge and the Jury all in one
fell swoop and counsel is satisfied that this pleases Mr. Skousen
as it did Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar and Benito Mussolini.
To this point, however, Mr. Skousen has not got the
backing of Stare Decisis.
Counsel feels he should not impose upon this Court by
lengthy citation of cases defining what is or isn't "due process,"
as he realizes that such determination hinges upon facts, the
law itself being clear. These facts abundantly show that the
subject Statute effectively denies any determination of rights
18
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before having the full fury of punishment visited-by a policeman.

POINT IV.
THE ACTION OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE
SEIZURE OF PROPERTY IS VOID AND PROHIBITED
BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 14, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, AS BEING BRUTAL AND UNREASONABLE.
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution:
"UNREASONABLE SEARCHES FORBIDDEN-ISSUANCE OF WARRANT.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated . . . ''
The place from which this seizure was made was a private,
bona fide place for use of members and guests of members,
(Findings of Facts No. 1), and it is submitted that the following Conclusion of Law entered by the Trial Court in support
of its Judgment should not be announced to be the law of
the land:

"CONCLUSION OF LAW #III."
"Seizure of said items referred to in Paragraph I, above,
was valid and lawful, and abuse of authority and excess of
force used in removing all of said items from said premises
and the WANTON and RECKLESS DESTRUCTION of

19
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items of personal property and the WANTON and RECKLESS
DESTRUCTION of wiring and a portion of the building itself (real property) does not vitiate or abrogate legality of
seizure, without warrant, of property from a private building."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Counsel acknowledges that Utah is among the majority
of States that adheres to the principle that illegally obtained
evidence is admissible in evidence, and he wishes to point out
to this Court that no objection was made or is now being made
to any evidence illegally obtained.
The sole point being Libelees' contention that:
( 1 ) The seizure was unreasonable, as being done in an

unreasonable manner, and

( 2) Therefore Judgment of propriety in seizure should
be reversed.
To this point, then, the first thing to be determined is:
WAS THIS SEIZURE UNREASONABLE?
Definition of unreasonable, Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd
Edition 1785: "Beyond the rules of reason or moderation;
immoderate or exhorbitant."

( 1) The Club, through its Attorney, asked Chief of
Police Skousen to leave all of the property on the premises of
Club Feraco and Skousen could retain the key until trial of
the case. Counsel promised Skousen no effort would be made
to resume business until after trial. Skousen refused and removal was made. (Findings of Fact XI).
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( 2) Some of the property was moved out in gravel
trucks. (Exhibit 31-D.)
( 3) Locked liquor lockers were reduced to kindling wood,
or less. (Page 3, Memorandum Ruling and Decision.)
( 4) Tables and seats covered with leather, fastened to
the walls or floors were torn out and cracked, splitting wood
and tearing upholstery in many places. (Page 3, Memorandum
Ruling and Decision.)
( 5) Real property was wantonly and recklessly destroyed. (Memorandum Ruling and Findings of Fact.)
( 6) Prisoner labor was used.
"THE SCENE LEFT THERE BY THE OFFICERS WAS
MORE SUGGESTIVE OF A VISIT BY THE 'REDS' THAN
BY THE 'RED, WHITE AND BLUE.' "
Counsel respectfully suggests that it is just that type of
mentality and approach to human dignity here reflected that
was responsible for the slaughter of 7,000,000 Jews in Europe
during the reign of Adolf Hitler.
There may be objection to such language, but counsel
suggests there was a time when the meanest peasant could
rest in his decrepit tenement, with a shaky roof and be subject
to the rain and hail and wind but the King and all his forces
dared not cross his threshold.
Give such mentality Stare Decisis and then watch pounding boots, uniforms, obesience or else, and citizens
dragged into the night by the hair of their head.
It's such a comfort to know such things can't happen here.

21
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But be fair about it-it has happened, and if this Court says
that those hurt can't complain because they can sue the policemen then that makes a hollow mockery of the XIV th Amendment and the Constitution of Utah.

I am sure that the survivors of any one of those 7,000,000
Jews wantonly slain probably had a cause of action for wrongful death.
The case of District of Columbia vs. Little, 178 F 2nd 13,
stands squarely for the proposition that

a health

officer

may not search a house without a warrant, despite statute,
unless there is an emergency which would justify immediate
action.
This Court can sustain the position of Libelees in setting
this proceeding aside by authority of the above case, it being
clear there was ample time to obtain warrant and proceed
under judicial supervision.
However, the facts at Bar give this Court opportunity to
re-affirm that in America, policemen are servants and protectors, not masters and sovereigns and administrators of life
and

dea~h

by largesse or caprice.

This language appears in the case of State vs. Aime, 62
Utah 476; 220 Pac. 704; at page 706, the Court quoting with
approval from People

t'J.

Alayen. 188 Cal. 237; 205 Pac. 435:

"There might be some reason, or grounds of public policy
for the State to refuse to the use of evidence thus wrongfull)
seized, on the grounds that its admission encourages and con
clones the lawless acts of over-zealous officers . . . "

It is most strongly urged that this Court has a positiv(
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duty to all of its citizens, living and yet unborn to unequivocally rule that wantonness and destructiveness by policemen
will not be tolerated. It is against our public policy.
A judicial precedent that police brutality and maliciousness,
exceeding the seriousness of the claimed law violation, abrogates legality is sorely required in American jurisprudence.
A. fortiori in this case, because of acquital of the very offense
upon which all of this wanton and reckless action is based.
Counsel concedes that Utah public policy is strongly opposed to spirituous beverage, but decency demands that what
might be considered indigenous intolerance should not preponderate to condone sanctimony and brute destruction.
Humanity and reason demand that this Court by strong,
positive and unequivocal language write a decision that will
be a red flag to all present and future would-be martinets and
self agrandizing fools.
To do otherwise would prostitute the concepts of our
Bill of Rights.

POINTV.
TITLE 32, CHAPTER 8, SECTIONS 16, 17, 18, 46 AND
48, 1953 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED ARE VOID AS BEING AMBIGUOUS AND VESTING JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN POLICEMEN, PROSCRIBED BY ARTICLE V,
SECTION I, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, AND THAT
SAID PROVISIONS ARE CONTRARY TO ARTICLE I,
SECTION 24, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, AND CON23
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TRARY TO THE XIVth AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
These punitive liquor statutes give to a policeman, who
could be an ignorant and suspicious bigot rather more noted
for physical courage and strength than a sensitive regard for
rights and feelings of people, wide discretion and unchannelled judgment as to procedure in case of liquor law violations.
Such men were called the "Brown Shirts" in Hitler's
Germany.
These statutes should be stricken because their ambiguity
and unchanneled mandates, of necessity, require the exercise
of judicial function by a policeman.
To sustain this position one need only examine the statutes
to see what unrestrained latitude is given:

If there is a real or supposed violation of the liquor law,
any Inspector, Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff, Mayor, City Judge, Justice of the Peace, Constable, Marshall, Peace Officer, District,
City or Town Attorney, or a Clerk of a Court ( 32-8-25) and all
other officers and employees of the State and employees of
any subdivision or agency of the State ( 32-8-26) are specifically authorized and duty bound to:
(a) Appear before a magistrate and by written oath give
information and the Judge may then issue a warrant and
direct seizure (32-8-16) or he may,
(b) Seize all tangible personal property of a building
where a violation occurs in his presence, IF HE BELIEVES one
of the businesses is illegal, (32-8-17), or he may,
2·l
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(c) Seize any liquor which IN HIS OPINION is had or
kept in violation of law, without a warrant, ( 32-8-18), or
he may
(d) Apply to a Court for a temporary injunction against
illegal use of premises and procure trial to abate it as a nuisance ( 32-8-46 and 32-8-47).
There it is-any one of maybe 10,000 persons in this
State can, under the statutes and with impunity, seize a bottle
of whiskey, destroy real and personal property, as in the case
at bar, or procure the levelling of a $1,000.00 fine and cancellation of lease.
The choice can be exercised any way that person chooses
to do it. Counsel defies opposing Counsel to show this Court
any attempted guide in the selection of what to do.
It should be clear that these statutes create not only a
possibility of unequal enforcement of laws, prevented by
Article I, Section 24, Utah Constitution and the XIVth
Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, but in fact unequal
enforcement has resulted:
(a) :McGillis, 65 P. 2nd. 1136, was permitted to operate
~·

legal business pending
and so was Riggins, 51 P.
But Club Feraco, though
judged not guilty of the

trial of charges of illegal conduct,
2d 645, and Kallas, 94 P. 2nd. 414.
its manager and waitress were adillegal conduct charged, had their

doors closed and their property destroyed.
(b) Mandeles, 108 P. 2nd. 512, only had a bottle of
whiskey seized. But Club Feraco was reduced to a shambles
by policemen and prisoners.
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(c) Recent seizures at two local bottle clubs, de hors thi
record, were confined to a few bottles of whiskey.
So it would seem severity of action can be determinec
by largesse, whim, caprice, favor, partiality, hatred or jus·,
plain enjoyment of the exercise of great power.
There are no standards and no restraints according tc
present state of Utah law, except: "Sue me, but don't tell
me I can't be just as brutal or just as gentle as it may please
me to be, as I can seize all of your property or a little of your
property or none of your property."
And
employee
they "are
necessary

the terrifying thing is that such may be done by any
of this State, as 32-8-25 very clearly states that
vested with the powers of peace officers and powers
to enforce the provisions of this Act."

It is, again, either terrifying or interesting to note that
this Court in the case of Allen vs. Trueman, Judge of Second
Judicial District, 100 Utah 36; 100 P. 2nd 355, ruled that a
statute authorizing the issuance of a search warrant on an
affidavit of information and belief was void under Article I,
Section 2 5 or our Constitution and yet, if this Court does not
agree with Libelees in this case it will give a ruling that a
seizure and search without a warrant is not void even though
the policeman need only have REASON TO BELIEVE that
one of the businesses being conducted is illegal.
Such a ruling would be exactly the same as a rule of case
law, in the Reporter System Headnotes saying:
"A policeman cannot justify a magistrate in issuing
a warrant for seizure of personal property upon his
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information and belief alone, and in such cases his
only recourse is to seize the personal property without
a warrant."
Counsel urges that these statutes are void as ambiguous,
and being a total and carte blanche delegation of judicial power
to 10,000, or more, State employees who may administer them
and have administered them in unequal degree for identical
offenses, and upon claimed offenses that may turn out to be
no offenses, as in the case at bar.

POINT VI.

THE SEIZURE IN THIS ACTION SHOULD BE
VOIDED AND DECLARED UNLAWFUL BY RECURRENCE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES TO PROTECT
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AS PRESCRIBED BY ARTICLE
I, SECTION 27, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION.
Article I, Section 27: "Frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles is essential to the security of individual rights and
the perpetuity of free government.''
This section should be applied with posttlve and equal
vigor to local despots as well as to usurping foreign potentates
with totalitarian ideology.

CONCLUSION
Public policy demands a rule of law that states police
brutality and excess of authority abrogates legality of such
27
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action for every purpose when the abuse is so great as to be
more dangerous to individual rights and liberty than is the evil
against which such brutality was levelled.
Also, must Utah be saddled with such a prolix and allencompassing and brutal and ambiguous and unworkable liquor
law, leaving so much to police decision and judgment as to
manner, means, method and punishment?
Chief Justice McDonough's language m State vs. Alta
Club, 232 P. 2nd, 759, suggests that this Act is "fraught with
difficult problems of application," to which we say amen.
In view of what has now happened under this Act,
this Court should correct the police notion that there may
be unrestrained force, brutality and destruction as long as
it pertains to spirits of alcohol, and this even if the accused
be acquitted.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL
Attorney for Libelees
506 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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